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OPINION  
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal requires us to interpret a state statute—the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Planned Community Act (UPCA), 68 
Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5101–414—in the bankruptcy context. 
Appellant Kelly Makowka seeks in Chapter 13 proceedings to 
avoid a portion of claims made by her homeowners 
association, Pocono Mountain Lake Estates Community 
Association (the Association). The Bankruptcy Court, in an 
order affirmed by the District Court, held that the Association 
had a valid statutory lien on Makowka’s residence pursuant to 
the UPCA, which the Association had enforced by obtaining 
judgments in debt against Makowka in state court. For the 
reasons that follow, we will vacate the District Court’s 
judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
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I 
Makowka owns a home in Pocono Mountain Lake 
Estates in Pike County, Pennsylvania, a planned community 
as defined under the UPCA. In 2005, she fell behind on her 
homeowners association dues, which began to accrue late 
charges. In April 2008, the Association sued Makowka in the 
Pike County Magisterial District Court to collect a portion of 
the unpaid dues and obtained a default judgment of 
$2,436.70. As additional dues went unpaid, the Association 
sued Makowka again in April 2010 and obtained another 
default judgment, this time worth $3,599.08. Both judgments 
were transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Pike 
County, which issued a writ of execution and attachment. 
Pursuant to that writ, a sheriff’s sale of Makowka’s property 
was scheduled for September 14, 2011.  
Two days before the sheriff’s sale, Makowka filed a 
Chapter 13 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In her proposed 
bankruptcy plan,1 Makowka moved to avoid the 
Association’s claims under 11 U.S.C.    § 522(f), which 
releases a debtor from obligations imposed by judicial liens 
                                              
1 Makowka proposed two bankruptcy plans that were 
rejected by the Bankruptcy Court before submitting her 
Second Amended Plan, which is the subject of this appeal. 
While this appeal was pending, Makowka proposed two 
amended plans. The Fourth Amended Plan is awaiting 
approval by the Bankruptcy Court and presumes that 
Makowka’s appeal to this Court is successful. The 
Bankruptcy Court has stayed proceedings pending the 
outcome of this appeal.  
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(i.e., money judgments) as well as non-possessory, non-
purchase money security interests. Although Makowka 
acknowledged that Section 5315 of the UPCA granted the 
Association a self-executing statutory lien on her residence in 
the amount of the unpaid dues, she claimed that a portion of 
that lien had been extinguished by law because the 
Association had failed to foreclose on the lien within the 
statutory period of three years. Therefore, to the extent the 
Association’s claims represented fees due before September 
12, 2008, i.e., three years before the date of her bankruptcy 
petition, Makowka contended that the Association had 
obtained dischargeable money judgments. 
The Bankruptcy Court denied Makowka’s motion, 
ruling that the Association had preserved its statutory lien. In 
an oral opinion, the Bankruptcy Court noted that it was 
“bound by Pennsylvania [a]ppellate decisions construing” the 
UPCA. These included the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s 
decision in Forest Highlands Community Association v. 
Hammer, 903 A.2d 1236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), which the 
Bankruptcy Court read to enable “an association . . . [to] 
perfect or enforce the lien for the unpaid assessments in a 
variety of manners, . . . [including] an action in debt.” App. at 
56 (discussing Hammer, 903 A.2d at 1240). The Bankruptcy 
Court also opined that a foreclosure action would be “odd” in 
the UPCA context, as the Association did not hold a mortgage 
upon which it could foreclose. It thus “reject[ed] the debtor’s 
argument that the mortgage foreclosure action would be the 
exclusive remedy.” Id. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court 
allowed the Association’s unavoidable claim of $7,835.82, 
which represented the value of the money judgments, accrued 
unpaid debts, and interest at the time of the order. Makowka 
moved for reconsideration. When that motion was denied, she 
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timely appealed to the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
The District Court affirmed. Turning first to the text of 
Section 5315, the District Court agreed that it supported 
Makowka’s position that foreclosure was the exclusive 
method to enforce the statutory lien. After noting that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet addressed the 
question on appeal, the Court considered the relevant state 
intermediate court decisions—the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court’s decision in London Towne 
Homeowners Association v. Karr, 866 A.2d 447 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2004), and the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s 
decision in Hammer—for guidance as to how the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule.  
The District Court adopted a narrow interpretation of 
Karr, reading the opinion to hold “that while an association 
may pursue an action in debt or contract against a tenant 
under 5315(f) to recover sums under a lien, ‘[t]he first step to 
enforcing an assessment lien is the filing of a foreclosure 
complaint.’” App. at 6 (quoting Karr, 866 A.2d at 453) 
(emphasis in original). It then found that Hammer 
“expand[ed] upon the rationale of Karr” and “clearly held 
that by filing an action in debt or contract, an association was 
enforcing its lien under the UPCA.” App. at 7 (discussing 
Hammer, 903 A.2d at 1241). The District Court criticized the 
Superior Court’s decision, opining:  
The Hammer court, in holding that the action in 
debt to collect unpaid assessments . . . satisfied 
the [enforcement] requirement in Section 
5315(e) . . . ignored the well-established and 
fundamental distinction between proceedings in 
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rem and those brought in personam. It is 
difficult for this Court to understand how an 
action brought under Section 5315(f) “to 
recover sums for which subsection (a) creates a 
lien” can be considered a “proceeding[] to 
enforce the lien” for those unpaid assessments.  
App. at 8. Despite its disapproval, the District Court thought 
it bound by Hammer because the decision “presents the latest 
and most definitive ruling by the intermediate courts of 
Pennsylvania with respect to the interpretation of Section 
5315.” Id. “[B]ecause the issue before this Court is 
unquestionably a matter of Pennsylvania law, it will give 
Hammer the binding effect that it must.” Id. (emphasis 
added). For that reason alone, the District Court predicted that 
“[b]ecause the Pennsylvania Superior Court was clear in its 
holding and there appears to be no authority contrary to 
Hammer,” the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not 
overturn Hammer. App. at 8 n.5.  
Following the District Court’s order, Makowka filed 
this timely appeal. 
II 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1334, and the District Court reviewed the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). We 
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
158(d) and 1291. 
Because the District Court sat as an appellate court 
reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s order, we exercise plenary 
review over its decision. In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 
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120, 128 (3d Cir. 1997). Like the District Court, we review 
the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations—such as the 
matter of statutory interpretation before us—de novo. See In 
re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2012).  
III 
Under the UPCA, an “association has a lien on a unit 
for any assessment levied against that unit or fines imposed 
against its unit owner from the time the assessment or fine 
becomes due. The association’s lien may be foreclosed in a 
like manner as a mortgage on real estate.” 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
5315(a). The lien does not exist in perpetuity, however, 
because the statute provides that “[a] lien for unpaid 
assessments is extinguished unless proceedings to enforce the 
lien are instituted within three years after the assessments 
become payable.” Id. § 5315(e). Even if the lien is 
extinguished, “[n]othing in [Section 5315] shall be construed 
to prohibit actions or suits to recover sums for which 
subsection (a) creates a lien or to prohibit an association from 
taking a deed in lieu of foreclosure.” Id. § 5315(f).  
The question sub judice is whether the Association 
enforced its statutory lien against Makowka when it sued her 
in debt. The parties agree that Makowka’s unpaid dues gave 
rise to a self-executing lien, and that the lien would have been 
extinguished by law absent any action by the Association 
within three years. But they disagree as to what actions 
qualify as “proceedings to enforce the lien” under subsection 
(e) of the statute. Makowka contends that there is only one 
way to enforce the lien: by filing a foreclosure complaint. If 
she is correct, she is subject only to the portion of the 
Association’s lien for unpaid dues that has not been 
extinguished—namely, for the fees that came due after 
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September 12, 2008, three years before her Chapter 13 
petition was filed. The Association, in contrast, argues that 
the UPCA permits multiple methods of enforcement under 
subsection (e). If that is so, its state court actions tolled the 
extinguishment period, and it holds a statutory lien for the 
total sum of the unpaid dues, plus late fees and interest. 
A 
We begin by noting that although the issue on appeal 
is a matter of state law, it has practical import in bankruptcy. 
As the Association correctly notes, an action to enforce the 
statutory lien through foreclosure generally has the same 
effect as a judgment in debt or contract, insofar as both enable 
an association to collect unpaid dues from a delinquent 
homeowner. In bankruptcy, however, the debtor may modify 
her obligations for certain categories of claims. In this 
context, the often inconsequential distinction between 
enforcement and alternate remedies under Section 5315 
determines whether an association may retain an unavoidable 
lien on its resident’s property or has a mere unsecured claim 
against her—the difference, as the parties here recognize, 
between potential payment and nonpayment. Given the 
significance of this state-law question in bankruptcy, we find 
it appropriate to resolve it here. 
As the District Court noted, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has not yet spoken to the issue presented in this case; 
therefore, “we must attempt to predict how that tribunal 
would rule.” U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 80 F.3d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1996). In doing so, we give due 
deference to the decisions of intermediate state courts. See id. 
(quoting Winterberg v. Transp. Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318, 322 (3d 
Cir. 1995)). State appellate decisions, however, are not 
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controlling: “while we may not ignore the decision of an 
intermediate appellate court, we are free to reach a contrary 
result if, by analyzing other persuasive data, we predict that 
the State Supreme Court would hold otherwise.” Gruber v. 
Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366, 1369 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 
Such persuasive data may include, inter alia, “what the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said in related areas” and 
“the ‘decisional law’ of the Pennsylvania intermediate 
courts.” Id. at 1369–70.  
Our precedent, therefore, is clear that a federal court 
interpreting state law may discount state appellate decisions it 
finds flawed, if it predicts the state supreme court would 
reach a contrary result. Here, the District Court properly 
considered the relevant decisions from intermediate courts of 
equal authority: the Commonwealth Court’s opinion in Karr 
and the Superior Court’s opinion in Hammer. But it 
improperly concluded that Hammer had “binding effect” 
merely because the case “presents the latest and most 
definitive ruling by the intermediate courts” on the 
interpretation of Section 5315. See App. at 8. Because it was 
not, in fact, bound by a decision of the intermediate appellate 
court, the District Court gave Hammer too much weight, 
particularly in light of its own cogent critique of the Superior 
Court’s analysis.  
Consistent with the District Court’s concerns, we 
decline to adopt Hammer because it is internally inconsistent, 
it conflicts with the text and structure of Section 5315, and it 
contravenes a fundamental precept of Pennsylvania law. We 
adhere instead to the more persuasive analysis presented by 
the Commonwealth Court in Karr. Accordingly, we predict 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that an 
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action in debt does not constitute a proper method to enforce 
a statutory lien under the UPCA, and that Makowka may 
avoid the Association’s claims in bankruptcy. 
B 
In Karr, a homeowners association sought to collect 
unpaid dues from a resident by recording a second lien 
against his property, and the resident moved to strike this 
second lien. 866 A.2d at 448–50. The Commonwealth Court, 
following a close reading of Section 5315, held that the 
association’s second lien was invalid. In her opinion for the 
Court, Judge Leavitt explained the distinction between 
“proceedings to enforce”—namely, a foreclosure action—and 
other remedies to collect. Id. at 452. She wrote that 
“[e]nforcement of an association lien is directly addressed in 
the Act” by subsection (a): “The association’s lien may be 
foreclosed in a like manner as a mortgage on real estate.” Id. 
at 451–52 (emphasis in original removed). This, however, did 
not preclude other remedies: “an association may also pursue 
payment of unpaid assessments by employing remedies less 
drastic than foreclosure. It is free, for example, to bring an 
action in debt or in contract to collect an assessment. 
Subsection (f) provides for such remedies. . . .” Id. at 452 
(emphasis added).  
Having distinguished methods to enforce the lien, 
which are described in subsection (a), and alternative 
remedies, which are preserved in subsection (f), the Karr 
court held that the association’s second lien “did not advance 
[its] enforcement of its [statutory] lien by foreclosure in ‘like 
manner as a mortgage on real estate.’” Id. (quoting 68 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5315(a)). Rather, it found that an association 
seeking to enforce its lien had to “strictly follow[]” the 
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procedural requirements of Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure 1141–50, which govern mortgage foreclosure 
actions. Id. Where the rules require a claimant to include 
information specific to a mortgage, the Karr court instructed, 
the association could substitute the UPCA’s analogues: for 
example, the association could point to the deed giving rise to 
the UPCA lien (termed the “UPCA declaration”) in lieu of the 
mortgage.2 Id. Thus, “[t]he first step to enforcing an 
assessment lien is the filing of a foreclosure complaint.” Id. at 
453 (quoting Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5315(a)). 
The Superior Court’s decision in Hammer purported to 
adhere to Karr’s reasoning, but expanded without explanation 
an association’s available methods of enforcement to include 
actions in debt and contract. There, the homeowners 
association attempted to execute a sheriff’s sale on its 
resident’s property to collect unpaid dues; the association 
argued that its perfected lien pursuant to the UPCA obviated 
the need to file a complaint. Hammer, 903 A.2d at 1237, 
1239. In response, the resident moved to set aside the 
association’s writ of execution because she had not received 
notice of the lien. Id. at 1237. The Hammer court found for 
the resident after phrasing the dispositive question thusly: 
“whether instigating a sheriff’s sale perfects an already 
perfected assessment lien and substantially complies with the 
requirements of [the] UPCA to allow enforcement of [the 
association’s] assessment lien.” Id. at 1239 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
                                              
2 For this reason, irrespective of the validity of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s observation that foreclosure would be an 
“odd procedural mechanism,” we find it consistent with the 
language of the UPCA. See App. at 56.  
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The Superior Court answered in the negative. The 
association’s failure to file suit, it held, violated the resident’s 
due process rights: “institut[ing] suit by mortgage foreclosure 
or fil[ing] an action in debt or contract . . . provide[s] [the 
resident] with ‘notice’ of the debt . . . and/or a means to deny 
liability.” Id. at 1241. The court also found support in Section 
5315, borrowing heavily from the Commonwealth Court’s 
analysis in Karr. At first, its reasoning mirrored the prior 
decision:  
Enforcement of an association lien is directly 
addressed by [the] UPCA, which states, as 
herein relevant: “The association’s lien may be 
foreclosed in a like manner as a mortgage on 
real estate.” . . . [A]n association is not 
precluded from pursuing other avenues to 
obtain payment of assessments less drastic than 
foreclosure. For example, an association can 
avail itself of an action in debt or in contract to 
collect an assessment. Subsection (f) of the 
UPCA provides support for such alternative 
remedies . . . . 
Id. at 1239–40 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, Hammer concluded that the association’s 
judicial sale did not constitute enforcement of its assessment 
lien “by foreclosure in ‘like manner as a mortgage on real 
estate.’” Id. at 1240. Like Karr, Hammer initially 
distinguished the enforcement mechanism provided in 
subsection (a)—foreclosure—from the “other avenues to 
obtain payment of assessments” in subsection (f). See id.  
Thereafter, Hammer took, in our view, a wrong turn by 
conflating the association’s ability to enforce with its 
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remedies to collect:  
[E]xpanding upon the rationale of Karr, we 
hold that [the association] seeking a judicial 
sale as the vehicle to secure payment of its 
assessment lien did not equate with the 
approved enforcement mechanism to collect an 
assessment lien by an association’s action in 
mortgage foreclosure, action in debt or contract. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Superior Court then buttressed this 
conclusion with an improper insertion into Karr’s holding: 
“[t]he first step to enforcing an assessment is the filing of a 
foreclosure complaint[, action in debt or contract].” Id. in 
1241 (alteration in original); but cf. Karr, 866 A.2d at 453 
(“The first step to enforcing an assessment lien is the filing of 
a foreclosure complaint.”). 
C 
In predicting whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would adopt Karr or the later decision in Hammer, we turn 
first to the language and structure of Section 5315. Under 
Pennsylvania law, statutory liens such as that provided by 
Section 5315 are construed strictly because they are an 
“extraordinary remedy” “which is more expeditious and 
advantageous . . . when compared to a breach of contract 
judgment.” Phila. Constr. Servcs., LLC v. Domb, 903 A.2d 
1262, 1267, 1268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); see also Murray v. 
Zemon, 167 A.2d 253, 255 (Pa. 1960) (mechanics’ liens are 
available only on such terms as the legislature sees fit to 
provide). Thus, “[t]he character, operation and extent of the 
lien must be ascertained from the terms of the statute which 
creates and defines it, and the lien will extend . . . only where 
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there has been at least a substantial compliance with all the 
statutory requirements.” United States v. Beaver Run Coal 
Co., 99 F.2d 610, 612 (3d Cir. 1938).  
The Commonwealth Court’s analysis in Karr comports 
with the text and structure of the statute at issue. Section 5315 
draws a clear distinction between subsection (e)’s 
“proceedings to enforce” the statutory lien on the one hand 
and the pursuit of “[o]ther remedies” in subsection (f) on the 
other hand. Subsections (a) and (e) define the creation and 
expiration of the statutory lien as follows: “the association has 
a lien . . . [when] the assessment or fine becomes due”; this 
“lien may be foreclosed in a like manner as a mortgage on 
real estate”; and the “lien . . . is extinguished unless 
proceedings to enforce the lien are instituted within three 
years.” 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5315(a), (e) (emphasis added). As 
the Commonwealth Court noted in Karr, the statute explicitly 
provides for enforcement by “foreclos[ure] in a like manner 
as a mortgage on real estate”; thus, one may enforce the 
statutory lien by filing an action in foreclosure. See 866 A.2d 
at 452 (quoting 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5315(a)).  
In contrast to subsections (a) and (e), subsection (f) is 
concerned not with the lien itself but with the “sums for 
which subsection (a) creates a lien.” 68 Pa. Cons. Stat.          § 
5315(f) (emphasis added). This shift in word choice 
demonstrates that actions in debt or contract provide an 
alternative recourse from the lien created by the provision, 
and do not constitute “proceedings to enforce the lien.” In the 
words of the statute, they are the “[o]ther remedies” available 
at common law explicitly “preserved” by the statute. Id. As 
the Karr court reasoned, an association need not take drastic 
action to collect on its association dues, as remedies exist “in 
lieu of foreclosure”: for example, the “actions or suits to 
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recover sums” and “taking a deed” described in subsection 
(f). 866 A.2d at 452 (quoting 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5315(f)). 
But these methods of collection create only an in personam 
judgment against the debtor, and have no bearing on the in 
rem lien on the resident’s property.3  
In response, the Association notes that subsection (a) 
provides that the lien “may  . . . foreclose[] in a like manner as 
a mortgage on real estate,” arguing that this permissive 
language gives it multiple methods of enforcement. But this 
case does not require us to determine whether foreclosure is 
the exclusive means to enforce the lien, as Makowka 
contends. Rather, we must decide only whether actions in 
debt are a valid way to enforce the statutory lien—and the 
language of Section 5315(f), which explicitly defines actions 
in debt as an alternative to the lien created by the statute, 
suggests not.  
                                              
3 Because Section 5315 provides for enforcement by 
foreclosure, it is unsurprising that the preservation of 
alternative remedies in Section 5315 has a close analogue in 
the mortgage foreclosure context. As the District Court 
succinctly noted:  
[I]t appears to this Court that subsection (f) 
permits an action on the debt underlying the lien 
in the same way that a mortgagee may choose 
to proceed upon a promissory note given by a 
mortgagor to obtain a judgment in personam 
rather than initiate in rem mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings. 
App. at 8. 
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Nor are we persuaded that other provisions of the 
UPCA militate in favor of a broader reading of “proceedings 
to enforce.” The Association contends that the term should be 
liberally construed to give effect to Section 5114 of the 
UPCA, which states: “[t]he remedies provided by [the UPCA] 
shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved 
party is put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed.” 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5114(a). But Section 5114 is 
inapplicable to the enforcement of the statutory lien, speaking 
only as it does to an association’s remedies for payment. 
Indeed, a restrictive interpretation of Section 5315(a), which 
creates the lien and defines its enforcement, has no effect on 
the availability of other methods of recovery, which have 
been explicitly preserved by subsection (f). Of course, we 
acknowledge that our reading of “proceedings to enforce” 
effectively precludes the Association from payment in this 
case. But a claimant’s inability to collect in the special 
context of bankruptcy, which sometimes involves the 
impairment of creditors’ rights, does not permit us to adopt a 
tortured interpretation of the provision giving rise to those 
rights. 
We therefore hold that Section 5315, as explained by 
the Commonwealth Court’s careful analysis in Karr, supports 
Makowka’s argument that the Association’s actions in debt 
did not enforce its statutory lien. 
D 
The Association urges that we follow the Superior 
Court’s later decision in Hammer and find that actions in debt 
enforce the statutory lien. See 903 A.2d at 1240. We predict, 
however, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not 
follow that approach.  
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As an initial matter, it is difficult to give credence to 
Hammer’s conclusion in light of the decision’s sparse 
reasoning and internal inconsistency on the issue of 
enforcement. As discussed in section B, supra, Hammer 
purported to adopt the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning in 
Karr, and like that case, initially distinguished the 
“enforcement” of the lien from other avenues to collect. See 
id. It then departed, relying on an improper insertion into 
Karr’s holding and thus tacking on new categories of 
potential enforcement methods. See id. (quoting Karr to state 
“[t]he first step to enforcing an assessment lien is the filing of 
a foreclosure complaint[, action in debt or contract]”) 
(alterations in original). The decision also elided the 
distinction between enforcement methods and remedies to 
collect, noting that actions in debt constituted “approved 
enforcement mechanism[s] to collect an assessment lien.” Id. 
These analytical tacks were made without explanation, and, 
as we explained in section C, supra, run contrary to the 
language and structure of Section 5315. 
Furthermore, as the District Court correctly noted, 
Hammer “ignore[s] the well-established and fundamental 
distinction between proceedings in rem and those brought in 
personam.” App. at 8; see also Bank of Pa. v. G/N Enter., 463 
A.2d 4, 6–7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (explaining the difference 
between in rem and in personam proceedings: a judgment in 
rem “creates a lien on the mortgaged premises . . . no matter 
who may be the owner at the time the judgment is entered”; a 
judgment in personam “does not bind strangers to the bond”). 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held firm to this 
distinction. See, e.g., Mancine v. Concord-Liberty Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 445 A.2d 744, 748 (Pa. 1982); In re Craig’s 
Estate, 109 A.2d 190, 195 (Pa. 1954). Moreover, recent 
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opinions of the Superior Court itself have adhered to this 
traditional precept. See, e.g., U.S. Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 982 
A.2d 986, 992 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009); Levitt v. Patrick, 976 
A.2d 581, 591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). Contrary to these 
numerous authorities, Hammer conflated an association’s 
right to proceed in rem to enforce the statutory lien with its 
option to file in personam suits to collect judgments against 
the resident.  
For these reasons, we find it appropriate to discount 
Hammer’s problematic statement about valid enforcement 
mechanisms. 
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, we predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow Karr, not 
Hammer. Therefore, the District Court erred when it deemed 
itself bound by the latter decision. In our view, the 
Association did not enforce its statutory lien on Makowka’s 
residence when it pursued actions in debt; therefore, any 
portion of the lien representing assessments due before 
September 12, 2008, has been extinguished. Accordingly, we 
will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
